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Stolen words1
"Creationist" was the self-designation used
by a Calvinist professor of biology, J. Lever,
in the Netherlands in the 1950s. He intended
to communicate to the reformed constitu-
ency that he understood as "creation" in the
scriptural sense the reality he studied as a
biologist—even while accepting the best
available biological knowledge of his time,
including evolution and genetics. Those who
would take the same reconciliatory attitude
in our time cannot use the label "creationist"
anymore. The word has become so tightly
linked with a particular cluster of views
opposing biblical faith and mainstream biol-
ogy, that it no longer communicates that one
believes this world, partly but reliably known
through the sciences, to be God's creation.
"Humanist" may be another such word.
Among the wider constituency of the
churches, who would be aware of a tradition
of "biblical humanism" (e.g., Erasmus) in the
late Renaissance and early modern period,
and even more, who could use that label for
himself or herself without being misunder-
stood? "Evangelical" may be one more such
term, which is in the process of losing the
wider meanings it had (and, for instance, in
the designation of Lutheran churches still
has), becoming more and more a label for a
particular style within the Protestantism.
Naturalism and Theology—Top-down or
bottom-up?
"Naturalism" is again another such term,
which religious communities were in the pro-
cess of losing—in this case, by associating it
with outspoken atheist interpreters of mod-
ern science. Thus, I appreciate highly Walter
Thorson's attempt to reclaim the right to use
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the word "naturalism"—both in opposition to
those outspoken atheistic interpreters and in
opposition to those within the Christian com-
munity who have accepted the atheistic
claim on "naturalism." Thorson seeks to
appropriate "naturalism" for the Christian
community, not as an unavoidable evil, a
fate that has come over us, a need to accept
the "status quo," but positively, as a theologi-
cally justified and valuable insight regarding
the human vocation.
I appreciate Thorson's insights in this
respect. I find important the observation that
naturalism became identified with the idea
that the world would be self-sufficient (p. 3).
I would like to add and emphasize that
self-sufficiency is not to be identified with
integrity—a coherent world well described by
laws of nature has integrity, without thereby
being self-sufficient.
However, I do wonder whether Thorson
does not claim too much when he places this
theological justification of naturalism in an
epistemic top-down setting, as if theological
ideas (and philosophical alternatives) pre-
cede and determine the sciences. For
instance, he writes: "Such limited, 'naturalis-
tic' enterprises are necessarily sustained
and informed by some broader, essentially
religious/philosophical understanding" (p. 2).
The header on page 3 indicates that natural-
ism in science requires a theological
foundation. Is it not the case that our natural-
ism is, at least in part, a lesson we have
learned from reality? We could have lived in
a world which would not have been amena-
ble to a naturalistic treatment even in the
realm of physics, say a world with physically
effective demons and ghosts—and this
world might still have been God's creation
and a world which would call for a Christian
way of life. If it is the case, as I surmise, that
we have learned our "naturalism" also from
reality, and not from theology alone, that
itself should not be a problem for Christians
who accept that one can learn something
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practically and theologically significant from "the Book of
Nature." Of course, whatever the world is like, the Christian
will understand this world as sustained by God, ontologi-
cally speaking. However, this creaturely existence need
not imply that the trajectory of coming to this understanding
necessarily begins with theology. Many elements of our
current understanding of reality, including our self-under-
standing regarding the nature and implications of faith,
have been influenced by secular understanding—and thus
seem to be more a poster/or/than Thorson's paper seems
to indicate.
By placing too much weight on
assumptions and ideology, Thorson fails
to distinguish authors who ... use evolu-
tionary biology also as an ideology ...
and others who do accept evolutionary
biology as scientifically adequate ...
If he had allowed more mutual interaction between science
and religious or philosophical commitments, Thorson
would have been able to maintain a more flexible view of
the rise of modern science. There is, certainly, some influ-
ence of religious ideas and values, including some high-
lighted by the Reformation, on the rise of modern science,
but those influences are part of a vastly wider and more
complex network of "causes" of the Scientific Revolution.2
If one grants that there is also some role for a bottom-up
approach from our experiences with the world to religious
reflections, one might also be more appreciative of authors
who think in terms of "the mystery behind creation" (p. 6).
By the way, the word "behind" seems an unhappy choice,
as most authors in this vein would rather speak of "mys-
tery" in, of, or underlying creation, and avoid too strong
reminiscences of dualisms indebted to earlier views of
reality. But even more do I have concerns regarding
Thorson's next sentence: "Religious ideas of nature fill the
vacuum left when we deny God as the Author of creation"
(p. 6). Thinking in creative ways about nature and its reli-
gious significance is not automatically denying "God as the
Author." It may be more a matter of humility, of awareness
that as creatures we do have the "Book of Nature" at hand,
and thus may seek to discern meanings there. Besides, it
may be attempts at exploring other images—speaking of
"Author" is just as metaphorical and human as other articu-
lations of "the Ground of our being." The strong opposition
which some theologians (with Karl Barth as a prime exam-
ple in the twentieth century) have made between religion
and Christian faith, seems to result in an unnecessary
opposition between the multitude of serious quests for
understanding and articulation appropriate and significant
views of faith and of reality.3
The Dismissal of "Extreme Darwinism"
Last but not least, the second part of Thorson's contribu-
tion is devoted to a discussion of biology. The main
suggestion seems to be that the functionality of biological
phenomena undermines expectations regarding a com-
plete physicalist understanding. It is suggested that
"extreme Darwinists" are lead by a priori assumptions
(e.g., p. 13), whereas they might well present their work
as a posteriori, emerging out of increased knowledge of
the traces of evolutionary history in fossils and in living
organisms, with its explanatory schemes justified in a
hypothetic-deductive fashion. By placing too much weight
on assumptions and ideology, Thorson fails to distinguish
authors who indeed use evolutionary biology also as an
ideology, whether socially or metaphysically, and others
who do accept evolutionary biology as scientifically ade-
quate without attaching these ideological consequences to
it. In this respect, the second part confuses what the first
part of Thorson's contribution helpfully disentangled, and
thereby seeks support for faith in marginal if not even mis-
taken science.4 It is a pity that by choosing this contested
territory as his prime example, Thorson's valuable insights
regarding naturalism and theology risk being lost.
Notes
1
 The reflections on "stolen words" were triggered by a comment by
Ernan McMullin on such words during one of a series of consulta-
tions at the Center of Theological Inquiry in Princeton, 1993-1996;
consultations at which I also had the pleasure to meet Walter
Thorson.
2
 A rich survey of the variety of historical views on the emergence of
early modern science in Europe, and its non-emergence in China
and the Islamic world, has been given by H. Floris Cohen, The Sci-
entific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1994); I offered some similar observations, far
less extensive, in W. B. Drees, Religion, Science and Naturalism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 77-88.
3
 For some reflections on contemporary "religious naturalism," see
W. B. Drees, "Thick naturalism: Comments on Zygon 2000,"
Zygon 35 (4 December 2000): 849-60.
4
 A good example of careful analysis without the exaggerated social
or metaphysical claims of the "extreme Darwinists" may well be
the work of Philip Kitcher. In his The Advancement of Science
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), he analyses extensively
and carefully the standing of biological understanding. His criti-
cisms of sociobiology, Vaulting Ambition (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1985) and of genetic determinism. The Lives to Come: The
Genetic Revolution and Human Possibilities (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1996; Penguin Books 1997), illustrate well that ap-
preciating evolutionary biology as a scientific understanding need
not imply accepting it as an ideology. "Function" does play a major
role in evolutionary understanding for example, for one particular
analysis of functional language in relation to a physicalist view,
introducing history as an additional major ingredient, see A. R
Millikan, "Proper function," Philosophy of Science 56 (1989),
288-302; reprinted in Millikan, White Queen Psychology and
Other Essays for Alice (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993).
Volume 54, Number 1, March 2002 25
